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USAWC FELLOWSHIP RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND
PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS:
CAN WE AFFORD TO KEEP OUR HEADS IN THE SAND?**

by

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

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1 JUNE 1996

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Stewart W. Wyland (COL), USA

TITLE: The National Security Strategy and Peacetime Engagement Operations:
Can We Afford to Keep Our Heads in the Sand?

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The rapidly unfolding global security environment of the 1990s confronts the US Army with numerous challenges encompassing issues of doctrine and force structure as well as the emphasis to be placed on traditional and nontraditional missions. This study examines current readiness focus, the reasonable expectations for upcoming contingencies, and mission preparation and readiness issues. It argues that limited resources and greater probability for deployment to peacetime engagement operations may necessitate a re-evaluation of the total focus on preparation for two near simultaneous major regional conflicts. The paper concludes that it is time to legitimize peacetime engagement operations preparation.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose. This paper was prepared and submitted to the Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh, pursuant to the independent research and writing requirement levied upon Army Senior Service College fellows during academic year 1995-1996. It is intended to provide a "school of thought" based on contemporary research of a complex topic regarding challenges facing our military.

B. Background. The Department of Defense (DoD) is undergoing a significant transformation as a result of a post-cold war social, political and economic revolution in Europe and the former Soviet Union. When the Berlin Wall came down, the future course for the military seemed to be fairly simple to map. This "perceived" simplicity, particularly on the part of elected leaders, resulted in almost immediate pressure to reap the "peace dividend" of force reduction.

Unfortunately, world events and operations such as Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, Hurricane Andrew, RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the ever increasing role of the United Nations (UN) in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts interrupted the smooth transition to what many saw as a peacetime Army. While the Army continues to implement major force reduction and base closure directives, the "simple course" for the military is no longer considered so simple as the nation, allies and former foes grapple with the complexities of military operations short of war. "The rapidly unfolding global security environment of the 1990s

confronts the US Army with numerous challenges encompassing issues of doctrine and force structure as well as the emphasis to be placed on traditional and nontraditional missions.”¹ Government and military organizations as well as academic and intellectual institutions all over the world are holding conferences, conducting studies, and publishing reports on myriad topics relating to the future need for, and use of, military forces. While continuing to perform many traditional and nontraditional missions in support of the nation’s foreign and domestic policies, the DoD finds itself in the unenviable position of attempting to manage monumental change. Army leadership is driving hard with the incredibly difficult challenge of meeting the world-wide commitments of today while planning and organizing for the future. However, future roles for the military are becoming less and less certain every day. For that reason, it may be prudent to re-evaluate and modify the direction we are heading as we approach the 21st century.

Re-evaluating the future direction of the Army is an incredibly complex and somewhat emotional topic area. I wish to emphasize that the intent of this paper is not to provide answers but to stimulate thought on the subject.

II. SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS

Much has been written in the last few years about operations “throughout the spectrum of conflict.” There is great confusion between and within organizations as to the appropriate terminology to be used when discussing traditional and non-traditional military operations. Terms such as operations other than war, peace support operations, stability

operations, aggravated peacekeeping, peacetime engagement, non-traditional military operations, low intensity conflict, security assistance and lesser regional contingencies are used interchangeably in some cases and dissimilarly in others.

US Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, dated December 1994, identifies and defines three types of operations: Support to Diplomacy (which includes Peacemaking), Peacekeeping (PK) and Peace Enforcement (PE).² But the spectrum of operations short of war also includes disaster relief, arms control, security assistance, counter-drug and counter-terrorism operations, humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuation operations.

For the purposes of this paper, The terms “peacetime engagement operations” and “peacetime engagement capabilities” will refer to any operations undertaken throughout the “spectrum of operations” which are not considered a part of a unit’s wartime mission. While peace enforcement operations require the application of military force and may include combat action, the conditions under which peace enforcement operations are undertaken are different enough from wartime conditions to warrant inclusion in the term “peacetime engagement.”

III. TODAY'S READINESS FOCUS

A. The National Security Strategy - President Clinton's 1995 National Security Strategy (NSS) of Engagement and Enlargement describes the security environment facing the

United States and her allies as follows:

The new, independent states that replaced the Soviet Union are experiencing wrenching economic and political transitions, as are many new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.... Russia's historic transformation will proceed along a difficult path, and China maintains a repressive regime.... The spread of weapons of mass destruction poses serious threats. Violent extremists threaten fragile peace processes in many parts of the world. Worldwide, there is a resurgence of militant nationalism as well as ethnic and religious conflict.... Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation natural resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long term . . .³

In response to that security environment, the NSS states that "our leadership must stress preventive diplomacy - through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, military-to-military contacts and involvement in multilateral negotiations."⁴ A primary objective of the NSS is enhancing security by maintaining a strong defense capability, which, among other things, requires our forces to "be able to credibly deter and defeat aggression, by projecting and sustaining US power in more than one region if necessary. . . . As a nation with global interests, it is important that the United States maintain forces with aggregate capabilities. . . sufficient to defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts."⁵

B. National Military Strategy - The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, utilizing guidance from the NSS and the DoD Bottom-Up Review, produced the National Military Strategy (NMS) of "flexible and selective engagement." This strategy requires our Armed Forces to accomplish "two national military objectives - promoting stability

and thwarting aggression [by performing three sets of tasks consisting of] peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our Nation's wars.”⁶ As appropriate, the NMS echoed the NSS in emphasizing the need to maintain “forces of sufficient size and capabilities, in concert with regional allies, to defeat potential enemies in major conflicts that may occur nearly simultaneously in two different regions.”⁷ (hereafter referred to as the two Major Regional Conflict [2 MRC] strategy.)

C. Department of the Army (DA) Position - Given the guidance received from the NSS and NMS, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army reaffirmed the 2 MRC strategy with in the Army Posture Statement stating “the Army's primary reason for existence is to fight and win the nation's wars. Because it prepares so strenuously for war, America's Army can also execute military operations other than war.

...”⁸ Further, US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, states,

in preparing to fight the nation's wars, the Army develops the leadership, organizations, equipment, discipline, and skills for a variety of operations other than war. Doctrine for war complements that for operations other than war.⁹

This has been followed by the belief that, as a general principle, if the Army trains to execute its most difficult warfighting tasks, it will be totally capable of undertaking less difficult ones. Thus the Army leadership, in consonance with the NSS and NMS, has directed and staunchly defended the policy of organizing, equipping, training and prioritizing resources for the Army based on the 2 MRC strategy, consciously subordinating preparation for peacetime engagement operations to "additional mission" status.

IV. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

Continued adherence to the 2 MRC strategy must be supported by a threat assessment which indicates the existence of conditions warranting major military involvement, nearly simultaneously, in more than one region of the world. The dilemma faced by the military is though the NSS and NMS direct 2 MRC preparedness, the international security environment described in both documents seems to indicate a greater probability for use of the military for peacetime engagement operations. Consider this excerpt from the NMS:

Today, the United States faces no immediate threat to its national survival.... In fact, in the 5 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have deployed our forces to assist in security and humanitarian crises about 40 times - a far greater pace than in the preceding 20 years. This level of activity, a measure reflective of these unsettled times, suggests a continuing need for flexible and robust military capabilities.... In surveying the international environment, the national security strategy as articulated by the President recognizes four principal dangers which our military, in combination with other elements of national power, must address: regional instability, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers, and the dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union and, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.¹⁰

Prudence dictates facing the reality of the changes in the nature of the international security environment. As then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin observed in 1993, "... while deterring and defeating aggression will be the most demanding requirement of the new defense strategy, our emphasis on engagement, prevention and partnership means that, in this new era, US military forces are likely to be involved in operations short of

declared or intense warfare.”¹¹ The probability that we will be required to prosecute 2 MRCs near simultaneously is minimal. The most likely scenario for the employment of our Armed Forces is continued involvement in sequential, and perhaps, multiple peacetime engagement operations.

The notion that the military must be prepared to react to 2 MRCs is not supported by historical precedent. “The prospect of twin wars has been the bugaboo of US Force planners since the eve of World War II - the only conflict in which the US military was in fact called upon to wage simultaneously what amounted to two separate wars. Chances for another world war, however, disappeared with the Soviet Union’s demise.”¹² And it should be remembered that although there were enemies on two fronts in WW II, US strategy was to maintain a strategic defense in the Pacific until defeating Germany, only then focusing all efforts toward victory in the Pacific. Since that time, planning strategy has been consistently centered around the notion that we could be required to fight at least two major conflicts, assuming that potential adversaries would most assuredly exploit US commitment in one conflict to begin another. The fact is, as pointed out by noted strategy and policy analyst Jeffrey Record,

our enemies have without exception refused to take advantage of our involvement in one war to start another one with us. . . . States almost always go to war for specific reasons independent of whether an adversary is already at war with another country. This is especially true for states contemplating potentially war-provoking acts against the world’s sole remaining super power. In none of the three major wars we have fought since 1945 did our enemies, when contemplating aggression, believe that their aggressive acts would prompt war with the United States.¹³

While the probability of the 2 MRC scenario can not be ignored, the demise of the Soviet Union as a supporter of potential adversaries greatly reduced that probability.

Sadaam Hussein, the only head of state foolish enough to test the post-cold war resolve of the United States to any extent, did so mostly unilaterally with a poorly trained and equipped military force and suffered the consequences. The prospect of “going it alone” against the US (and the allies we will inevitably bring to any conflict) is one that no nation will undertake lightly, even if the US is engaged elsewhere.

So the reasonable expectation is that the world community will be called more likely called upon to react to Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRC) and regional conflicts. The US military, therefore, is destined to become involved in peacetime engagement operations for many and varied reasons, the most prevalent of which will be discussed.

First, the distinction of being the world’s only remaining super power carries with it the awesome responsibility of providing leadership in the world community. While the US may retain the position of single super power for only a decade or so, that period will offer great opportunity to affect world events. American leaders traditionally relish the role of world leadership and will not always relinquish that role willingly. To remain actively involved in global affairs will unquestionably include involvement in the full range of peacetime engagement operations to further US interests and/or those of her allies. On this point, policy expert Jerome Kahan noted,

The US has a serious role to play in peace operations, given its position as a world leader and its global military capabilities. In situations where the US wants to exhibit leadership it must risk putting forces on the ground in order to show commitment and gain international credibility and front line support from other nations.¹⁴

Next, the United Nations (UN) is becoming increasingly involved in global events and the US is becoming increasingly involved in the efforts of the UN. From 1989-1992

the UN established 13 peacekeeping operations- the same as its previous 43 years of existence. National Defense University strategist Dennis Quinn pointed out,

After WWI, the US and many other countries looked to the promise of the League of Nations to secure a new world order. The promise was not to be a reality. After WWII, the US and many other countries looked to the UN to secure a new world order. Again, the promise was not to be a reality. Now, after the Third World War, i.e. the Cold War, the US and many other countries are again looking to the promise of a world organization, again the UN, to ensure peace and stability in the world.¹⁵

To be sure, the degree to which the US will become involved in UN peacetime engagement operations is dependent upon resources available, degree of impact on national interest, risk associated, and support of the American people. The above notwithstanding, “even if the US declines to support [UN operations] with combat forces, most UN operations will continue to involve some form of US military logistics, communications, or surveillance support.”¹⁶

Third, this is a critical time in the history of the NATO alliance and in relations among European nations in general. The United States National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement is designed to take advantage of newly developing relationships and security arrangements to foster the ideals of democracy and freedom throughout the world. “Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. . . And democratic states are less likely to threaten US interests and more likely to cooperate with the US to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development.”¹⁷ The United States has always provided strength and leadership to NATO and will continue to do so as long as the alliance exists. Further, many former Warsaw Pact nations are looking toward NATO, through the Partnership for

Peace and with full support from the United States, to further new found desires for freedom and self-reliance. At the same time, emerging nationalism, economic strife, and ethnic, religious and political differences virtually assure situations of conflict will occur which threaten the interests of our NATO allies or our “Partners for Peace.” Peacetime engagement operations in support these allies are inevitable.

Fourth, while most military professionals prefer to avoid this discussion, the fact remains that the DoD and separate services are continuously involved in a never-ending battle to justify congressional budgetary support. Force structure modifications and equipment modernization require congressional support which is increasingly difficult to obtain in light of the diminished threat of a major conflict. In fact, Congress enacted legislation as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 that directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a program to be known as the “Civil-Military Cooperative Action Program.” Senator Sam Nunn, who drafted the legislation, said,

I am totally convinced that there is a proper and important role the Armed Forces can play in addressing many pressing [domestic] issues. I believe we can re-invigorate the military’s spectrum of capabilities to address such needs as deteriorating infrastructure, the lack of role models for tens of thousands, indeed hundreds of thousands if not millions, of young people, limited training and education opportunities for the disadvantaged, and serious health and nutrition problems . . .¹⁸

While the continued use of the Armed Forces in peacetime engagement operations has minimized their use in domestic missions (with the exception of natural disasters), it is clear that many in Congress would support Senator Nunn’s position. Thus, the services, while not actively pursuing additional missions, understand that one advantage of

participation in peacetime engagement operations is to help justify congressional funding support and maintain focus on “traditional” military operations.

Finally, with the advent of CNN and the Internet, events in the farthest corners of the world are flashed across television and computer screens and in newspapers almost as they happen resulting in ever-increasing pressure to “provide humanitarian assistance” or “put an end to atrocities.” Operations in Northern Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda are perfect examples. There is every reason to believe that the pressure created by the international media will have increasing impact on any US decision to conduct peacetime engagement operations.

V. PREPARATION AND READINESS

The increase in peacetime engagement operations since 1989 raises questions about the propriety of the Army position on mission preparation and training. However, the experience of the 10th Mountain Division in both Operations ANDREW RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE between August 1992 and May 1993 reassured the Army leadership that the position is valid. In late 1993 Major General S.L. Arnold, Commanding General of the division during both operations, observed the following:

Some believe that the training Army units receive to carry out their wartime missions will not prepare them for operations other than war. Others believe that placing Army units into operations such as those in Florida and Somalia will cause warfighting skills to deteriorate because of the dissimilarities between the requirements of the two kinds of activities. The division's experience to date finds neither concern is warranted. [Additionally] the Army requires neither special units nor pre-operational team-building training to prepare for operations other than war.¹⁹

This experience has enabled the Army leadership to confidently embrace preparation for the 2 MRC strategy as “the right way,” despite the fact that current writings are replete with assertions that there is a need to prepare for peacetime engagement operations. Some examples follow:

Our missions are changing, and how we perform them is changing as well. . . . We must operate in multiple paradigms simultaneously with diverse friends and allies, from operations like Central Africa to those like the gulf war, and we must accommodate illogical shifts across paradigms like the nomadic herder with an air defense missile. Paradigm shifts create opportunities, but they also create vulnerabilities. . . . General Gordon Sullivan, then CSA.²⁰

When viewed through historical precedence, operations other than war are indicative of business as usual for the US military, whereas combat operations are the exception With the end of the Cold War, the US military now has to focus on worldwide ‘peacetime engagements’ in operations other than war with the same degree of commitment as it prepared to fight its combat roles. General George Joulwan, SACEUR²¹

Precisely because it is ‘not war but like war,’ preparing for peacekeeping is not business as usual There is no standard peacekeeping mission. Each operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, geographic, economic and military characteristics the next step in preparing forces for peacekeeping is providing training that allows soldiers and leaders to adjust their mindset from combat to peacekeeping.²²

. . . we are entering an era in which the predominant form of conflict will be smaller and less conventional wars waged mostly within recognized national borders....A military establishment dedicated almost exclusively to preparation for conventional combat, and strongly averse to dealing with violent challenges that cannot be effectively dealt with by conventional means, is a military establishment that is not ready for unconventional conflict²³

So, all the previous discussion leads to inevitable questions: Is the current course meeting expected needs? Is the focus of all efforts and limited resources in the proper direction to adequately respond to the most likely operational necessities?

Despite significant force level reductions and peacetime engagement increases, the Army continues to focus all efforts on the wartime Mission-Essential Task List (METL).

The Army trains to METL, resources to METL, equips to METL and reports unit readiness based on METL. Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations says,

Training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat. The first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills. Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission-essential task list.²⁴

Army leadership counts on this focus preparing our forces for 2 MRCs and "hopes" it also makes them ready for peacetime engagement operations contingencies. However, "hope" is not a plan nor a course of action and significantly underestimates the potentially dangerous challenges of peacetime engagement operations.

The fact is, there are some very important considerations regarding mission preparation and readiness that may not be receiving timely emphasis and response at DA level, some of which are discussed below.

A. A major study prepared for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements) entitled "Peace Operations Training and Education in the US Armed Forces," produced the following significant findings supporting the above assertion:

1. Peace operations are a unique set of military activities which demand special training and education to achieve high levels of proficiency to ensure early success. . . . Their validity as a separate set of training requirements is already *implicitly* recognized by the greater effort devoted to preparing units alerted for peace operations missions.

2. The services and joint community believe that pre-deployment training will suffice for peace operations, even in crises response, although

evidence indicates that specialized training, beyond that which may be possible once a unit is alerted for a peace operations mission, is required. This belief in consistent adequacy of pre-deployment training . . . has become *de facto* policy in the Armed Forces.

3. Concerns about the effect that specialized training for peace operations might have on training for wartime missions . . . are often translated into a denial of *any* special training requirements for peace operations, until a specific mission is assigned.²⁵

While up to now the Army has been relatively successful (and probably fortunate) in providing adequate pre-deployment training to units designated for peacetime engagement operations, studies have shown that upon notification “unit planning activities tend to focus on the mechanics of deployment [with] unique conditions of the peace operation affect[ing] the preparation as they become known.”²⁶ This leaves little time for specialized training.

While two of the Army’s pre-eminent Combat Training Centers (CTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Federal Republic of Germany, must be given credit for their incredible efforts in training combat units prior to deployment to peacetime engagement operations, caution must be observed in characterizing those efforts as “the answer” to the Army’s pre-deployment preparation problem. First, while the JRTC and CMTC offer peace operations scenarios and have been used for pre-deployment training for several operations, the peace operations scenarios are utilized on an “as needed” or “as desired” basis, leaving the preponderance of the training time for wartime METL related training of combat units. Second, the large number of units requiring training at the CTCs limits the time any one unit can have in the training area, better known as “the box.”

Third, resources and, in some cases, maneuver space in “the box” limits the type units able to be trained, often neglecting the peace operations training requirements of combat support and combat service support units.

B. Another consideration is the effect that wartime METL training has on peacetime engagement operations preparation. Some would argue that it is inappropriate to over-generalize by stating that all wartime METL training is counter-productive to peacetime engagement operations preparation in all units. According to a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations information paper, there could be some benefit to some units.

As an example, a combat unit performing a humanitarian assistance or supply mission for an extended period with little opportunity for training in its basic warfighting skills could see its readiness degrade. On the other hand, a combat support or combat service support unit performing a mission it normally would perform in wartime, such as transportation, supply, law enforcement, or road building would not incur the same degradation to its readiness and could potentially benefit.²⁷

While the above statement is partially correct, consideration must be given to the conditions for which the METL training is performed. For example, training for a transportation task in wartime and in peacetime engagement operations are not the same because the conditions are different for each task. Once again, caution must be exercised in characterizing a unit as wartime METL trained based solely on the performance of tasks in a non-hostile environment.

C. There is little effort at DA level to identify and provide training and preparation resources targeted for peacetime engagement operations. For instance, despite the fact that a greater percentage of Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units are being called upon to perform peacetime engagement operations,

there is little increase in training resources identified to support preparation. DA Pamphlet 350-38, Standards in Training Commission (STRAC), which is the training ammunition allocation authority, recognizes no requirement (and therefore allocates no ammunition) to increase the individual weapons qualification frequency for CSS soldiers from annual to semi-annual or quarterly. The result is a “robbing Peter to pay Paul” effort by local commanders and staffs to provide more individual marksmanship training to CSS soldiers.

D. There are significant issues associated with the current Unit Status Reporting (USR) system as pertains to peacetime engagement operations. The unit readiness ratings in Personnel, Equipment on Hand, Equipment Serviceability and Training are reported “based on the unit’s capability to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized and designed.”²⁸

1. There is an inherent conflict in reporting unit status based on wartime mission when all or part of a unit is preparing for or participating in a peacetime engagement operation. Unit commanders are understandably hesitant to report wartime mission deficiencies that result from training or preparing for non-wartime mission tasks. This puts the unit commander in the position of either accurately reporting his/her unit as less than totally combat ready or optimistically reporting combat readiness which may not be totally accurate.

2. “Many units send significant elements in support of [peacetime engagement operations] missions, but have no way of reporting the temporary loss on the USR. This means the unit may be C-1 on paper, but in reality, one third of its manpower and equipment are committed to a peace operation thousands of miles away.”²⁹ The

current USR regulation does not account for this problem. The final draft of the new USR regulation, which is under final review at this writing, appears to address deployment effects by adding a “deployed unit status report.” However, instructions for completing the report states, “The overall C-level and all resource area levels on a DEPLOYED USR will be determined subjectively. Deployed unit commanders will assess and determine these levels based on the resources required to accomplish the mission for which the unit is organized and designed (full wartime mission).³⁰

3. The current USR does not adequately allow commanders to account for the significant impact of peacetime engagement operations on their wartime readiness upon return from an operation. As we have seen earlier, a unit will take anywhere from 3 to 6 months to return to wartime readiness, yet the USR drives commanders to “race back to readiness” for reporting purposes, which, according to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) “can lead to inefficient use of training resources and compound other problems that the unit is facing.”³¹ The final draft revision does not address this issue.

It is important at this juncture to recognize the extraordinary efforts of unit commanders and field staffs throughout the Army in providing soldiers identified for peacetime engagement operations with the requisite tools (training, resources, etc.) for success in their respective missions. In most cases, however, the efforts of those commanders are contrary to current accepted doctrine, policy or guidance; a fact which often goes “officially” unrecognized. Dedication to preparation for the 2 MRC strategy has caused the Army leadership, almost out of necessity, to adopt somewhat of a “head in the sand” posture as regards preparation for peacetime engagement operations.

VI. SOME THOUGHTS ON DIRECTION

In fairness to the DoD and Army leadership and as mentioned early on, the President's National Security Strategy has tied the military to the 2 MRC scenario and cannot be ignored or even easily subordinated by peacetime engagement operations. Unless and until the 2 MRC strategy is revised, there is no choice but to keep it at the forefront of preparation efforts. For that reason, it is paramount that the Army leadership continues to press DoD to revise the findings of the Bottom-Up Review, thereby guiding the Administration away from the 2 MRC strategy.

If the Administration continues to compel the military to prepare for 2 MRCs, then another alternative is for the US to “avoid participation in traditional peacekeeping activities and limit participation in future UN peace operations to those operations where our unique capabilities can make a decisive difference.”³² In other words, if the US was to limit military support to peace enforcement operations only, leaving traditional “support to diplomacy” and “peacekeeping” missions to allies, then the “preparation dilemma” now faced would not exist. Clearly, this is easier said than done and, though not controlled by the DoD, should be pursued by DoD leadership.

There are several solutions being studied by the DoD, such as changes to force structure, realigning the responsibilities of the Active and the Reserve Components, focusing selected units on peacetime engagement operations, and creating a less specialized, more homogeneous Army (much like the Marine Corps). Each of these solutions, however, is extremely long term and does not satisfy the current dilemma.

In the short term, however, it is imperative that the Army leadership faces reality.

They must openly address the fact that

the Army, as it stands today, is imbued with a certain level of ‘embedded peacetime engagement capabilities’ and that, given limited resources, an increase in the level of embedded peacetime engagement capability increases the risk that must be taken in our forces’ ability to respond to 2 near simultaneous MRCs. Up to now, Army leadership has been generally unwilling to increase embedded peacetime engagement capabilities at the cost of less responsive MRC capability.³³

The Army can not continue in this direction. DoD and Army leadership must address the issues raised in the previous section lest we put soldiers and civilians “in harm’s way” without the proper preparation, training and equipment.

VII. CONCLUSION

The underlying assertion in all that has preceded is that there is no alternative but to accept peacetime engagement operations as a major mission for the Army and, as such, “must move purposefully from the world of words to the world of actions: developing doctrine, perfecting [force] structures, acquiring equipment, training troops and writing plans.”³⁴ Army leadership must legitimize peacetime engagement operations preparation; put resources against it, train it, measure it, and report readiness for it. Taking a practical approach to this preparation, developing discreet activities for peace operations with tasks, conditions and standards, will probably result in the finding that this is not the insurmountable problem that many perceive it to be. Commanders can identify to what units and type units the activities apply, which tasks can or must be trained prior to

notification for deployment, which can wait until the pre-deployment train-up period, and which we are already doing.

As stated in the beginning of this paper, this is an extremely complex and emotional issue. Superb commanders and staffs have been able to circumnavigate the training and preparation dilemma to prepare soldiers for every peacetime engagement operation the Army has faced. However, in the words of Colonel Karl Farris, Director of the Army Peacekeeping Institute,

we are a good enough Army to get by when called upon to perform peace operations, but we should not have to get by. We could be facing another ‘Task Force Smith’ but this time in a peace operation. That is, we will be committing soldiers and units to missions for which they were not adequately trained or equipped.³⁵

This paper has laid out what the author believes to be inescapable logic about the direction the Army must take in preparing for peacetime engagement operations. A brief recap follows:

1. International security requirements have changed drastically with the breakup of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall.
2. The National Security Strategy continues to tie the military to preparation for two near simultaneous major regional contingencies.
3. The greatest probability is that US forces will be required to perform peacetime engagement operations as opposed to two MRCs.
4. Preparation for two MRCs conflicts in many ways with preparedness for peacetime engagement operations.

5. Peacetime engagement operations must be accepted as a major mission for the Army, including the requisite training, resourcing and readiness reporting.

Only time and world events will validate the assertions in this paper, but if it has provoked thought on the subject, it's ultimate goal has been achieved.

ENDNOTES

¹ Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. and Richard H. Shultz Jr., eds. Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for US Policy and Army Roles and Missions, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, preface.

² Department of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington: US Department of the Army, December 1994), 2-6.

a. Support to Diplomacy - Components include peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy. Military actions contribute to and are subordinate to the diplomatic peacemaking process. Many of these actions are the typical day-to-day operations conducted by the military as part of the peacetime mission. The stationing of military forces abroad as part of forward presence may contribute to stability and creation of conditions necessary for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

b. Peacekeeping (PK) - Military or paramilitary operations, undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

c. Peace Enforcement (PE) - The application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of PE is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term settlement.

³ President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington: White House, February 1995, 1.

⁴ Ibid., 7.

⁵ Ibid., 8,9

⁶ John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Washington: Pentagon, 1995, i.

⁷ Ibid., p. 5.

⁸ Togo D. West Jr., and Gordon R. Sullivan, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1996, Posture Statement presented to the 104th Congress, 1st session (Washington: US Department of the Army, 1995), 18.

⁹ Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: US Department of the Army, June 1993), Ch. 13.

¹⁰ Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy, 2.

¹¹ Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review. Washington: Department of Defense, October 1993, sect. IV.

¹² Jeffrey Record, "Ready for What and Modernized Against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization", Parameters, Vol 25 (Autumn 1995): 22.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

¹⁴ Jerome Kahan, Peace Support Operations and the US Military, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Dennis J. Quinn, ed., 1994, 33.

¹⁵ Dennis J. Quinn, Peace Support Operations and the US Military, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994.

¹⁶ Arthur H. Barber III, "Engagement Through Deployment: Shaping America's Future Military," Parameters, Vol 24 (Winter 1994-1995): 20.

¹⁷ Clinton, A National Security Strategy, p. I.

¹⁸ Sam Nunn, Domestic Missions for the Armed Forces, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February, 1993, 2.

¹⁹ S.L. Arnold, and David T. Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other than War." Parameters, Vol. 23 (Winter 1993-1994) 19, 23.

²⁰ Gordon R. Sullivan, "America's Army - Strategic Force for Today and Tomorrow," Defense 95, Issue 1, 9.

²¹ George A. Joulwan, "Operations Other Than War: A CINC's Perspective," Military Review, February 1994: 5, 10.

²² John P. Abizaid and John R. Wood, "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peace Environment," Special Warfare, April 1994: 14, 20.

²³ Record, Parameters, p. 24

²⁴ Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations, 86.

²⁵ Department of Defense, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Report, "Peace Operations Training and Education in the US Armed Forces," February 1995: ii, iii, 15, 46.

²⁶ US Army Combined Arms Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Interim Report, "The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," June 1995, 3.

²⁷ Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Information Paper, DAMO-SSP, Subject: The Effect of Peace Operations on the Army's Mission, November 1995.

²⁸ Department of the Army, Unit Status Reporting (Final Coordinating Draft) Army Regulation 220-1 (Washington: US Department of the Army, undated), 3-1.

²⁹ CALL Interim Report, June 1995, 2.

³⁰ AR 220-1 (Final Coordinating Draft), 11-2.

³¹ CALL Interim Report, June 1995, A-8.

³² John E. Clark, "Which Forces for What Peace Ops?", Proceedings, February 1995, 47.

³³ Colonel Hank Zimon, Senior Army Planner, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Briefing for University of Pittsburgh Graduate Students, Pentagon, December 1995.

³⁴ Quinn, Peace Support Operations and the US Military.

³⁵ Colonel Karl Farris, Director, Army Peacekeeping Institute, interview by author, October 31, 1995, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

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